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The Polysemy of Privacy
RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR.

∗

“The Polysemy of Privacy” considers the highly protean nature of the concept
of “privacy,” which extends to myriad disparate legal interests, including
nondisclosure, generalized autonomy interests, and even human dignity. For a
concept of such central importance to many systems of protecting fundamental
rights, its precise contours are surprisingly ill defined. This lack of determinate
meaning is not limited to the concept of privacy in the United States; virtually all
legal systems that utilize privacy (or its first cousin, “dignity”) have difficulty
reducing the concept into specific, carefully delineated legal interests. In some
respects, privacy means everything—and nothing—at the same time. Moreover,
even in those contexts where one can identify privacy at a relatively choate, rather
than highly abstract, level of jurisprudential analysis, the right of privacy often
comes into direct conflict with other fundamental rights. For example,
commitments to freedom of speech and to a free press often conflict with privacy
interests; these conflicts, in turn, force courts to secure one interest only at the
price of undermining another. In the United States, unlike in the wider world,
protecting privacy interests through tort law generally will give way to advancing
concerns associated with securing expressive freedoms. This Article considers
some of the causes and effects of the privileging of expressive freedom over
privacy/dignity in U.S. constitutional law and suggests that comparative legal
analysis of the concept of privacy might help us to better understand both what
privacy does mean and also what it should mean.
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INTRODUCTION: POLYSEMY AND PRIVACY
Sometimes we use the same word to indicate different things. For example, in
standard American English, the word “play” can carry several meanings, including
a noun (a theatrical production or a single round in a sporting event) or a verb (a
diverting activity, often associated with children). Even though spelled and
pronounced identically, the word simply means different things in different
contexts. “Ball” is another example of a polysemous word; it can refer to a
spherical object, a formal dance, or, more generically, a good time (i.e., “we had a
ball last night”).
Like “play” and “ball,” the concept of “privacy” can be used to refer to multiple
legal concepts. Privacy can refer to an autonomy interest; that is to say, the right to
do or refrain from doing something. In the United States, the right to terminate a
pregnancy is an aspect of a constitutional right of privacy that relates mainly to
autonomy interests.1 But this is hardly the only way one might conceptualize the
idea of privacy. Indeed, it arguably is a rather odd construction of the word, given
that privacy in nonlegal contexts usually denotes seclusion or nondisclosure, rather
than more generalized autonomy interests.
In fact, privacy logically can and does refer to an interest in not disclosing
personal information; the historical roots of the right of privacy in the United States
relate to this aspect of the concept. Warren and Brandeis, in their iconic article in
the Harvard Law Review,2 argued that the common law of torts should protect an
interest in nondisclosure of certain true but embarrassing personal information.3
Although the law of defamation traditionally provided an economic recovery only
for the dissemination of damaging but false information, Warren and Brandeis
argued that the law of tort also should provide a recovery for the dissemination of
true information that was harmful to personal or business interests in the absence of
some significant public interest supporting disclosure of the information.4 Their
argument proved persuasive, and most states recognized a right to recover damages
associated with the public disclosure of private facts.5

1. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965).
2. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890).
3. See id. at 205–14.
4. See id. at 211–19.
5. See Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy,
98 CALIF. L. REV. 1887, 1892–95 (2010) (discussing the incorporation of privacy torts in
various states during the period 1899 to 1940). Richards and Solove note that “by 1940,
privacy had been recognized in only a distinct minority of U.S. jurisdictions—by common
law in twelve states (California, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Missouri, New Jersey, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina) and by statute in
only two others (New York and Utah).” Id. at 1895. After publication of William Prosser’s
pathbreaking 1941 treatise and subsequent iconic law review article on the four distinct torts
of privacy, WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS (1st ed. 1941); William
L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960), many more jurisdictions adopted privacy
torts. See Richards & Solove, supra, at 1901 (“In the little more than two decades since the
publication of his first torts treatise in 1941, Prosser’s conception of tort privacy had become
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These examples—privacy as autonomy and privacy as nondisclosure—also
highlight an important distinction in the use of the concept in both the United States
and Europe: whether legitimate privacy interests primarily implicate protection of
“privacy” (however defined) against the government, against other private citizens,
or against both the government and other citizens. In other words, is privacy
something we demand from the government or something we demand from each
other and private corporations? To be clear, a fully theorized understanding of
privacy should encompass protection against both the government and private
actors that unduly seek to compromise a reasonable interest in either autonomy or
nondisclosure. Yet, I think that a tendency exists in the contemporary United States
to think about privacy primarily as running against the government, rather than
against other citizens and private corporations.
Although the proposition is contestable, I want to suggest that, in the
contemporary United States, most citizens understand privacy interests to implicate
both nondisclosure and autonomy rights against the government; by way of
contrast, privacy law does relatively little to protect citizens against each other or
against corporations that seek to collect and sell personal information that arguably
fits within the scope of the Warren and Brandeis concerns.6 In the contemporary
European Union, on the other hand, privacy concerns are as much about securing
personal information from other private interests, including both other citizens and
corporations, as they are about autonomy claims against the government.7
The Fourth Amendment, for example, serves as a general framing device for
privacy discourse in the United States; police officers may not search an

a majority doctrine.”).
6. In fact, the situation is even worse than this preliminary assessment would suggest;
even in those circumstances where state courts or state legislatures act to create privacy
protections that limit—or even prohibit—the disclosure of personal information, the First
Amendment, and more specifically the commercial speech doctrine, make the validity of
such privacy protection open to serious constitutional doubts. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.,
131 S. Ct. 2653, 2668–72 (2011); see also infra notes 37–45, 137–39, and accompanying
text.
7. See, e.g., Francesca Bignami, European Versus American Liberty: A Comparative
Privacy Analysis of Antiterrorism Data Mining, 48 B.C. L. REV. 609, 681 (2007) (“True,
European privacy law promotes interpersonal respect among individuals. But it also protects
privacy against the state.”); Michael L. Rustad & Sandra R. Paulsson, Monitoring Employee
E-mail and Internet Usage: Avoiding the Omniscient Electronic Sweatshop: Insights from
Europe, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 829, 866 (2005) (“European countries have formulated an
all-encompassing cultural and legal response to privacy-based actions as compared to the
United States, which continues to delineate a sharp distinction between private and public
workplaces.”); Yohei Suda, Monitoring E-mail of Employees in the Private Sector: A
Comparison Between Western Europe and the United States, 4 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L.
REV. 209, 248 (2005) (“Overall, Europe considers the right to privacy, including data
protection, to be fundamental, even in the workplace.”); Flora J. Garcia, Comment, Bodil
Lindqvist: A Swedish Churchgoer’s Violation of the European Union’s Data Protection
Directive Should Be a Warning to U.S. Legislators, 15 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 1205, 1206 (2005) (“The different approaches to privacy in the United States and
the European Union are deeply rooted in traditions much broader than the concept of
privacy, such as the role of government in private life, the role of the press, and the freedoms
that are afforded to the media generally.”).
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individual’s home, person, or effects without a warrant, and no warrant may issue
except upon a showing of probable cause.8 The Supreme Court of the United States
has exhibited an amazing talent for finding exceptions and exemptions from the
general warrant requirement,9 but Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is not the most
relevant consideration for immediate purposes. Instead, the most immediately
relevant point is that the Fourth Amendment helps to frame the culture’s
expectation of privacy as an interest running against the state.10 The generalization
of privacy via the rubric of substantive due process did nothing to alter this focus
on government, rather than private entities, as the principle threat to a generalized
interest in personal autonomy and self-definition.
One last introductory point merits attention: even if legislators and state court
judges charged with updating the common law of torts11 wished to protect privacy
with respect to public disclosure of private facts, the First Amendment would
present a substantial obstacle to the project.12 A robust doctrine of protection for
speech and press rights, arising under both the Free Speech and Free Press Clauses

8. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”).
9. See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968). But cf. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (holding that a law enforcement
officer’s placement of a GPS tracking device on a private car constitutes a “search” of
private property under the Fourth Amendment and requires a warrant); Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961) (holding that if police obtain evidence in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, such evidence must be categorically excluded from the trial of the defendant in
order to deter future Fourth Amendment violations).
10. See, e.g., Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950 n.3 (“Whatever new methods of investigation may
be devised, our task, at a minimum, is to decide whether the action in question would have
constituted a ‘search’ within the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Where, as here,
the Government obtains information by physically intruding on a constitutionally protected
area, such a search has undoubtedly occurred.” (emphasis omitted)).
11. See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 3–5, 12–23, 35–
43, 81–83, 164–71 (1982) (arguing that courts should use their traditional common law
powers, “the common law function,” to “update” the law, including areas governed by
statutes, at least in circumstances where a particular statute has fallen into “desuetude,” i.e.,
when the law in question no longer “fits the legal landscape” and is “out of phase with the
[legal] topography”). As Judge Calabresi explains, “the judicial common law would attach to
statutory rules that are out of phase just as much as to common law precedents or doctrines.”
Id. at 166. To be clear, Judge Calabresi acknowledges that the task of legal updating is
properly shared by both courts and legislatures; a problem arises, however, when legislatures
fail to regularly update laws that have ceased to play any useful role in the governance of
contemporary society. See id. at 2–7.
12. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2668–72 (2011) (rejecting a
privacy-based justification for a Vermont law protecting the confidentiality of physicians’
prescription data by prohibiting the distribution of this information for marketing purposes
and instead holding that the First Amendment protects the sale of such information to
pharmaceutical companies for their use in targeted marketing efforts called “detailing”).
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of the First Amendment, has gone a great way toward obliterating both judicial and
legislative efforts to secure privacy rights against nongovernmental actors.13
Just as New York Times Co. v. Sullivan14 radically limited the scope of
defamation law in the United States in the service of creating a more robust
marketplace of ideas, the same doctrine has also limited the ability of states to
impose money damages for the disclosure of truthful information that causes harm.
This makes sense, obviously enough: if public disclosure of false information
enjoys a constitutional license, how could one withhold protection for disclosure of
truthful but embarrassing information? The constitutionalization of tort law remains
an important structural limit on any efforts to secure privacy rights against
nongovernmental actors. Moreover, the Supreme Court’s First Amendment
jurisprudence remains very much a work in progress, as demonstrated by the
Court’s recent decision in Snyder v. Phelps.15
But the U.S. indifference to privacy as an interest in need of protection from
private actors goes well beyond the limits flowing from Sullivan; even in instances
where no serious constitutional right to publish confidential information exists,16
neither Congress nor state legislatures seem much inclined to act. Accordingly, the
surreptitious collection of private information regarding web surfing habits, or
medical records, is generally legal. If a person uses a web search engine such as
Explorer or Firefox in the United States, the company providing that web browser
may collect and store a user’s searches. So too, a commercial website such as
Amazon, Ebay, or Facebook, may generally collect, bundle, and sell information
collected from users of the company’s site.
In the United States, under the state action doctrine, any rights of privacy arising
under the Fourth Amendment or the Due Process Clauses simply have no
application with respect to private companies.17 Although Congress or a state
legislature could enact positive legislation protecting privacy interests in these
contexts, such legislation generally does not exist. To a degree that likely seems

13. See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 532–35 (2001) (citing and applying
precedents limiting the scope of tort law to provide financial recoveries for the dissemination
of information, even false information, pertaining to public officials, public figures, and
matters of public concern).
14. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
15. 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011). Phelps holds that highly targeted protest, aimed at inflicting
maximum emotional harm, is nevertheless protected speech and cannot serve as the basis of
imposing tort liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress or intrusion upon
seclusion (a privacy tort) if the speech activity at issue addresses a matter of public concern
and otherwise takes place lawfully. See id. at 1215–20. But see id. at 1222 (Alito, J.,
dissenting) (“Our profound national commitment to free and open debate is not a license for
the vicious verbal assault that occurred in this case.”).
16. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985)
(holding that Sullivan does not privilege publication of false information about a matter that
does not constitute a matter of public concern or involve a public official or public figure and
that a state may impose tort liability on a standard of fault lower than Sullivan’s “actual
malice” standard).
17. See generally Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Back to the Briarpatch: An Argument in
Favor of Constitutional Meta-Analysis in State Action Determinations, 94 MICH. L. REV. 302
(1995) (discussing and critiquing the United States Supreme Court’s theories of state action).
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remarkable to European eyes, privacy interests against nongovernmental entities
are regulated, if at all, by the marketplace.
In sum, the legal concept of privacy in the United States is narrowly defined as
implicating rights against the state, and important questions regarding
nondisclosure with respect to nongovernmental actors remain largely unanswered
by either legislatures or courts. The fact that U.S. law does not comprehensively or
reliably protect all aspects of privacy does not mean, however, that other polities
must ask the same questions about privacy—or give the same answers.18
For example, the European Court of Human Rights, in the context of privacy
rights, has expressly held that signatories to the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“European Convention”)
have a duty to protect European Convention rights from private, nongovernmental
forms of abridgement:
The Court recalls that although the object of Article 8 [the right of
privacy] is essentially that of protecting the individual against arbitrary
interference by the public authorities, it does not merely compel the
State to abstain from such interference: in addition to this primarily
negative undertaking, there may be positive obligations inherent in an
effective respect for private or family life.19
Thus, the European Court of Human Rights does not rely on the concept of state
action to strictly limit the scope of rights secured under the European Convention;
the relative weakness of U.S. privacy law protections against nongovernmental
actors simply does not hold true in other democratic nations committed to securing
the rule of law and the protection of fundamental human rights.20
To be clear, I am not suggesting that the U.S. approach is self-evidently wrong
or misguided. Instead, my point is a more limited one: consideration of how other
nations’ legal systems address privacy issues could help us to better understand and
appreciate with greater specificity and clarity the relevant issues involved and the
viability of various approaches to safeguarding the “right to be let alone.”21
This Article considers the polysemous nature of privacy and attempts to unpack
and identify substantive, procedural, and cultural issues essential to securing
privacy interests effectively. Part I begins with an analysis of the protean nature of
privacy and attempts to identify, with some particularity, some of the interests that
the concept properly encompasses and the limited scope of protection that these
interests presently enjoy in the United States.22 Part II then takes up the importance
of the public/private dichotomy to securing privacy rights; this Part argues that

18. See, e.g., X & Y v. Netherlands, App. No. 8978/80, 8 Eur. H.R. Rep. 235, 239–40,
¶ 23, 241, ¶ 27, 242, ¶ 30 (1985) (holding that Article 8 of the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms may require signatory states to
adopt “measures designed to secure respect for private life even in the sphere of the relations
of individuals between themselves”).
19. Id. at 239.
20. See infra notes 97–117 and accompanying text.
21. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2, at 193.
22. See infra notes 30–57 and accompanying text.
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privacy law in the United States would benefit significantly if U.S. lawmakers and
judges were to think more carefully and consistently about the problem of private
power being used to burden—or even abridge—privacy interests.23 At the same
time, however, the cultural salience of privacy might constitute an inhibiting factor
in using statutes and judicial decisions to protect privacy more robustly against
nongovernmental actors.
The Article considers the impact of the First Amendment’s Free Speech and
Press Clauses on the potential scope of privacy protections in Part III. Simply put,
even if the U.S. federal government or particular state governments attempted to
better secure privacy interests against abridgment by nongovernmental actors, the
First Amendment would impose serious limitations on the scope of such legal
reforms.24 Part III also examines the radically different baseline that prevails in
contemporary Europe with respect to these issues and questions. Under the
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, privacy interests in Europe
can and often do take precedence over the exercise of expressive freedoms.25 These
boldly contrasting approaches demonstrate quite clearly that the U.S. approach
does not represent the only potential means of accommodating a strong
commitment to expressive freedoms with a concomitant and equally robust
commitment to protecting privacy interests.
Part IV analyzes the possible benefits of using alternative nomenclature that is
more communitarian than “privacy” to safeguard privacy interests.26 More
specifically, this Part considers the German approach to securing privacy interests,
an approach generally framed in terms of securing “human dignity” and “free
development of the personality,” rather than “privacy” as such.27 This Part posits
that adopting more communitarian legal constructs might be conducive to securing
broad, group-based legal protection for privacy interests. At the same time,
however, in the United States, the use of privacy in lieu of broader, more
communitarian legal concepts probably is not a mere accident of history. Moreover,
Part IV proposes that a group-based approach to securing privacy interests might be
less viable in a polity, like the United States, that features a pervasive distrust of
government as a central part of its political identity.28
Finally, this Article concludes by accepting and embracing the polysemous
nature of privacy.29 The Conclusion nevertheless cautions that the potentially
infinite breadth of the concept of privacy can endanger the successful protection of
the interests it seeks to safeguard. Polysemy, in itself, is not necessarily a bad thing,
but imprecision in the definition of a fundamental human right can and will make
its enforcement significantly more difficult; in addition, imprecision or vagueness
in the contours of a fundamental human right presents real difficulties for reliably
securing that right globally. By considering the disaggregated legal interests, issues,
institutions, and cultural factors associated with defining and protecting privacy—

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

See infra notes 58–78 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 79–98 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 99–117 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 118–62 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 118–39 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 140–62 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 163–66 and accompanying text.
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and doing so in an overtly comparative legal analysis—we will stand a much better
chance of effectively securing these important interests from both governmental
and nongovernmental threats.
I. PRIVACY AS NONDISCLOSURE, AUTONOMY, AND DIGNITY
In their seminal 1890 law review article, Samuel D. Warren and Louis D.
Brandeis posited that the law of tort should provide some measure of protection
against the public disclosure of private facts.30 They argued that “the right to be let
alone” should enjoy formal legal protection and suggested that “[o]f the
desirability—indeed of the necessity—of some such protection, there can, it is
believed, be no doubt.”31
After surveying the law of property and copyright, Warren and Brandeis argued
that a reasonable extension of then-existing law could create a zone of protection
against the disclosure of private facts.32 In the end,
[t]hese considerations lead to the conclusion that the protection
afforded to thoughts, sentiments, and emotions, expressed through the
medium of writing or of the arts, so far as it consists in preventing
publication, is merely an instance of the enforcement of the more
general right of the individual to be let alone.33
Thus, recognizing a right against the publication of private facts without permission
provides legal protection akin to “the right not to be assaulted or beaten, the right
not to be imprisoned, the right not to be maliciously prosecuted, the right not to be
defamed.”34
From a European perspective, however, the notion that disclosure of private
facts without permission might give rise to liability is entirely quotidian. Once an
incident of aristocratic privilege, the protection of personal honor and dignity later
democratized so that, in theory, all persons are potentially deserving of honor and
respect. Such protection is a baseline principle of the civil law of Germany and
France (and has been for a very long time).35
As Professor James Q. Whitman puts the matter, in Europe, legal systems
tended to level everyone up, whereas in the United States, we have “leveled
down.”36 Moreover, “[t]o say that America has absolutely no law of civility is to
say too much. But to say that in general America has no law of civility—especially
as compared with a country like Germany—is to make the right generalization.”37

30. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2, at 193–96.
31. Id. at 193, 196.
32. See id. at 197–206.
33. Id. at 205.
34. Id.
35. See James Q. Whitman, Enforcing Civility and Respect: Three Societies, 109 YALE
L.J. 1279 (2000) (discussing the protection of personal honor in the civil law of France and
Germany and contrasting this protection with the approach in the United States).
36. See id. at 1285, 1319–21, 1344, 1358–59, 1387 (emphasis omitted).
37. Id. at 1384 (emphasis omitted).
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In contrasting U.S. and German law on the protection of honor with respect to
personal insult, Whitman observes that “[t]his is a body of law that shows, in many
of its doctrines, a numbness to free-speech concerns that will startle any
American.”38
In thinking about the protection of privacy in transatlantic terms, I think a key
distinction that must be addressed is the utter absence of mandatory civility norms
in the United States. Under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment, one is
free in the United States to engage in targeted insult, with the aim of
“assassinating” the character of a public official or public figure, with complete
legal impunity.39 One is equally free to drop the f-bomb in a public school board
meeting with parents and even children present40 or to wear a jacket emblazoned
with “Fuck the Draft” in a public courthouse.41 Whether one attempts to fix liability
on a theory of defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, or even
invasion of privacy, in the United States the claim will fall to concerns about
ensuring the public debate regarding public officials, public figures, and matters of
public concern is “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”42
Indeed, the Supreme Court has specifically held that government may not
prohibit or punish publication of truthful information of public concern, even if that
information was not lawfully secured in the first instance.43 In invalidating the
application of a federal law that prohibited publication of unlawfully taped
telephone conversations, the Supreme Court explained that, in the context of
defamation, “neither factual error nor defamatory content, nor a combination of the
two, sufficed to remove the First Amendment shield from criticism of official
conduct.”44 The Justices “[thought] it clear that parallel reasoning requires the
conclusion that a stranger’s illegal conduct does not suffice to remove the First
Amendment shield from speech about a matter of public concern.”45
Although the precise scope of a “matter of public concern” is not entirely clear,
in Bartnicki v. Vopper, the Supreme Court thought it virtually self-evident that a
dispute about a public school district’s negotiations with a teachers union fell
within the scope of the category: “[t]he months of negotiations over the proper
level of compensation for teachers at the Wyoming Valley West High School were

38. Id. at 1312.
39. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52–55 (1988); see also infra
note 150 (discussing Larry Flynt’s stated motives in publishing a fake Campari ad in Hustler
magazine).
40. See Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901, 902–03 (1972) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting) (The majority vacated and remanded for reconsideration, where the New Jersey
Supreme Court, in State v. Rosenfeld, 303 A.2d 889 (N.J. 1973), held the remark was
protected because it did not and was not likely to incite a breach of the peace.); see also
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972) (overturning conviction for use of opprobrious
language to a police officer).
41. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); see also Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr.,
Cohen v. California: “Inconsequential” Cases and Larger Principles, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1251
(1996).
42. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
43. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 532–35 (2001).
44. Id. at 535.
45. Id.
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unquestionably a matter of public concern, and respondents were clearly engaged in
debate about that concern.”46 As Justice Stevens, writing for the Bartnicki majority,
explained, “That debate may be more mundane than the Communist rhetoric that
inspired Justice Brandeis’ classic opinion in Whitney v. California, but it is no less
worthy of constitutional protection.”47
Thus, even a brief and somewhat cursory analysis of the impact of the First
Amendment’s free speech and free press guarantees immediately establishes the
difficulty, if not outright impossibility, of securing a broad-based right of privacy
as nondisclosure, even if U.S. legislatures or courts were inclined to create such
protection. In the post-Sullivan era, the “right to be let alone” has little doctrinal
bite; it essentially protects against the disclosure of private facts that do not relate
to a public official, a public figure, or a matter of public concern. By definition,
however, almost anything that a newspaper or a television station wishes to report
is a “matter of public concern,” else why would the media outlet seek to report on
the matter in the first place? In sum, the First Amendment seriously limits the
ability of government to secure personal privacy as nondisclosure.
The European Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Justice, as
well
as
domestic
constitutional
courts,
such
as
Germany’s
Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court), have been much more
sympathetic to the protection of personal information with respect to all citizens,
including public officials and public figures, than has the Supreme Court of the
United States.48 In cultures that believe that all persons have an inherent right to the
protection of personal honor and dignity, securing privacy as nondisclosure is not
merely an important but rather an essential project.49 By way of contrast, however,
in a place like the United States, which really lacks any legal recognition of
mandatory civility norms,50 it should not be surprising that privacy as nondisclosure
receives so little formal legal protection.
One also should note that the protection of false statements of fact makes U.S.
law radically out of step with most of the world. In places like Germany and Japan,
the law of libel permits recovery for the publication of true statements that damage
personal reputation in the absence of a countervailing public interest in
dissemination of the information.51 In other words, before Sullivan even enters the

46. Id.
47. Id. (citation omitted).
48. See, e.g., Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Dec.
15, 1999, 101 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 361 (Ger.)
(“Princess Caroline”) (finding that the publication of some contested photos of the Princess
would violate her privacy rights under the German constitution but refusing to enjoin the
publication of others), overruled in part by Von Hannover v. Germany, App. No. 59320/00,
40 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1 (2005) (holding that the German court’s ruling was insufficiently
protective of the Princess’s privacy rights under Article 8 of the European Convention).
49. See, e.g., Campbell v. MGN Ltd., [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 A.C. (H.L.) 457
(appeal taken from Eng.).
50. See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1213, 1219–20 (2011).
51. See RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR., THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN CROSS-CULTURAL
PERSPECTIVE: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH 101–18, 155–
64 (2006); see also Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Defamation in the Digital Age: Some
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picture, U.S. law devalues privacy by protecting the disclosure of truthful
statements that degrade or embarrass the subject, even in the absence of a
particularly good reason for protecting the disclosure. When one adds Sullivan and
Bartnicki to the equation, the balance in favor of publication becomes
tremendously skewed in favor of vindicating the interests of the press and would-be
voyeurs as opposed to “the right to be let alone.”
Indeed, if publication of private facts is really little different than a physical
assault in its potential emotional and psychological effects on the subject
(victim?),52 taxing the entire social cost of such publication against the subjects
seems highly questionable. Yet, this is precisely how the First Amendment’s
mandate affects the ability of both the federal and state governments to provide a
right of recovery for violations of privacy interests.
Finally, it bears repeating that a general legal culture uninterested in securing
privacy interests undoubtedly helps to explain the lack of constitutionally
permissible statutory general privacy protections. Even though legislative action to
secure privacy with respect to public officials and public figures and regarding
matters of public concern has been significantly curtailed under the First
Amendment, substantial privacy protections could be, but have not been, enacted in
the United States. In other words, the “Wild West” legal and political culture
generally does not provide privacy protections even when the First Amendment
would not stand in the way.
Consider, for example, the common practice of web browsers and websites
collecting (“mining”) data from those using the websites. The First Amendment
would not impose any serious barrier to a law requiring mandatory disclosure of
such practices, regulation of the practices (including a ban on data mining without
the subject’s overt and voluntary consent), or even a flat ban on such practices.53
Comparative Law Observations on the Difficulty of Reconciling Free Speech and Reputation
in the Emerging Global Village, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 339, 348–50 (2005) [hereinafter
Krotoszynski, Defamation in the Digital Age].
52. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2, at 205–07.
53. But cf. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2668, 2672 (2011) (invalidating,
notwithstanding a strong privacy-based justification for the statute, a Vermont law that
protected the privacy of physician and patient prescription data by prohibiting the sale of
such data to pharmaceutical companies for marketing purposes). To be sure, Justice Anthony
Kennedy, writing for the Sorrell majority, did credit the general importance of protecting
privacy interests. See id. at 2672. Even so, however, he squarely rejected Vermont’s privacy
defense, noting that when seeking to safeguard privacy interests, “the State cannot engage in
content-based discrimination to advance its own side of the debate.” Id. On the other hand,
Justice Stephen Breyer, writing in dissent and joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and
Elena Kagan, found that Vermont’s desire to protect the privacy of physicians’ prescribing
practices constituted a significant government interest. See id. at 2682 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(“And this Court has affirmed the importance of maintaining ‘privacy’ as an important
public policy goal—even in respect to information already disclosed to the public for
particular purposes (but not others).”). He also found that Vermont’s statute was sufficiently
narrowly tailored to survive First Amendment judicial scrutiny. See id. at 2683 (“The record
also adequately supports the State’s privacy objective.”); id. (“[T]he statute serves a
meaningful interest in increasing the protection given to prescriber privacy.”). Justice
Breyer, however, was merely writing in dissent, whereas Justice Kennedy wrote for the 6-3
Sorrell majority. See id. at 2658–59.
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Congress has not enacted such a law, nor have most state legislatures. As a
consequence, data mining and resale of personal information gathered from the use
of web browsers and websites is regulated, if at all, by the market itself.54 This
provides even more evidence of privacy as nondisclosure’s relative lack of cultural
salience in the contemporary United States.
The U.S population’s general distrust of government and government
institutions no doubt provides at least a partial explanation for this lack of privacy
protection through the civil and criminal law—and also helps to explain the
absence of mandatory civility norms more generally.55 If one believes that
government routinely abuses its powers, permitting government to create and
enforce mandatory forms of politesse could be deeply unsettling. A government
empowered to decide when offensive speech “goes too far” could use this authority
to systematically squelch speakers and viewpoints that it finds disagreeable or
troublesome (whether or not the particular modality of the speaker’s expression
actually transgresses generally held notions of privacy, dignity, or civility).56 By
deploying the First Amendment to disallow mandatory civility norms, in the
service of safeguarding privacy and even human dignity, this risk of abuse of
discretionary government power can be, and is, completely avoided. But at what
cost? I do not suggest that the U.S. approach is wrong or misguided; my point is a
more limited one. We should be careful to weigh both the benefits and costs of
disallowing legal protections for privacy, dignity, and personal honor rather than

54. Some commentators, such as Professor Fred Cate, argue that reliance on the market
and competition will ensure adequate protection of personal data and also meaningful choice
for consumers. See Fred H. Cate, The Changing Face of Privacy Protection in the European
Union and the United States, 33 IND. L. REV. 173, 223–24, 231 (1999). This claim is open to
doubt. For market-based privacy protections to be effective substitutes for regulatory
protections, two conditions would first have to exist. First, consumers would have to be
actively engaged and make some effort to obtain information about privacy policies and then
use this information when deciding which browsers or websites to patronize. Second, even if
consumers could be relied upon to use information about privacy policies to shape their
online behavior, the policies themselves would need to be readily available and written in
easy-to-understand language. Neither condition appears to exist in the contemporary United
States.
55. See Phelps, 131 S. Ct. at 1220.
56. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Questioning the Value of Dissent and Free Speech
More Generally: American Skepticism of Government and the Protection of Low-Value
Speech, in DISSENTING VOICES IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 209, 213, 215–19 (Austin Sarat ed.,
2012) [hereinafter Krotoszynski, Questioning the Value of Dissent] (arguing that pervasive
distrust of government better explains U.S. free speech theory and practice than other, more
purposive theories of the First Amendment); see also Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The Shot
(Not) Heard ’Round the World: Reconsidering the Perplexing U.S. Preoccupation with the
Separation of Legislative and Executive Powers, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1, 28–34 (2010)
[hereinafter Krotoszynski, The Shot (Not) Heard ’Round the World] (positing that pervasive
mistrust of government explains both structural and substantive limitations on the scope of
government power in the United States and noting that other polities do not exhibit this same
level of skepticism toward the government and its institutions).
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simply and reflexively accepting their absence as a necessary cost of securing the
freedom of speech and the press.57
It also bears noting that the U.S. approach, which utilizes a broad prophylactic
ban on government efforts to enforce mandatory civility norms, represents a radical
break with the prevailing legal approach in the wider global legal community. Even
if, after careful consideration of the merits, the United States decides to stick to its
guns, this disjunction with prevailing standards in other democratic polities will
certainly produce legal frictions, and these conflicts of values will arise with greater
regularity in our more globalized marketplace of ideas.
II. PRIVACY AND THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DICHOTOMY
Professor Owen Fiss has cautioned repeatedly that in thinking about expressive
freedom in the United States all too often we frame the project solely in terms of
vigilance against government efforts at censorship.58 He persuasively argues that
we risk the vibrancy of the marketplace of ideas if we permit private corporations
to exercise unlimited censorial powers through the use of unregulated market
power.59 If Google, for example, were to block a particular website, this form of
private censorship might well prove far more effective at limiting access to the
information and ideas contained on the website than would a government law or

57. See JON L. MILLS, PRIVACY: THE LOST RIGHT (2008).
58. See Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1412–
16 (1986); Owen M. Fiss, Silence on the Street Corner, 26 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 1–3
(1992); Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 781, 787–91 (1987). As Fiss
states the proposition, “The state should be allowed to intervene, and sometimes even
required to do so, . . . to correct for the market.” Fiss, Why the State?, supra, at 791.
59. See Fiss, Why the State?, supra note 58, at 794 (“In another world things might be
different, but in this one, we will need the state.”); Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure,
supra note 58, at 1415 (“Just as it is no longer possible to assume that the private sector is all
freedom, we can no longer assume that the state is all censorship.”). To be clear, Professor
Fiss does not repose reflexive faith in the state as a force for good; instead, he suggests that
we should not simply assume that all exercises of private power to regulate the marketplace
of ideas will reliably advance the project of democratic self-governance. As he explains his
point, “it [is] fair to say that in a capitalist society, the protection of autonomy will on the
whole produce a public debate that is dominated by those who are economically powerful.”
Id. at 1412. Accordingly,
[t]he market—even one that operates smoothly and efficiently—does not assure
that all relevant views will be heard, but only those that are advocated by the
rich, by those who can borrow from others, or by those who can put together a
product that will attract sufficient advertisers or subscribers to sustain the
enterprise.
Id. at 1412–13. From this vantage point, government interventions in the market can enhance
rather than degrade the marketplace of ideas by countering the ill effects of a monopoly or
oligopoly of voices. See, e.g., Fiss, Silence on the Street Corner, supra note 58, at 3 (“Most
radicals do not have the funds to buy airtime, the networks are reluctant to sell airtime to
them anyway, spokespersons for the underprivileged do not have the capital to buy a
newspaper or television station, and coverage of protest activities is circumscribed by the
economic imperatives that drive the privately-owned media and today enfeeble public
broadcasting.”).
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regulation imposing criminal or civil penalties for disseminating or reading the
content.
Notwithstanding Professor Fiss’s cogent arguments in favor of rethinking the
free speech project in terms of greater regulation of private power over the
marketplace of ideas, most U.S. lawyers, judges, academics, and citizens think of
rights almost exclusively as running against the state rather than against
nongovernmental actors (such as publicly traded corporations). This same
phenomenon exists with respect to privacy rights: in the United States, we tend to
think of privacy rights running against the state rather than against each other.60
To be sure, some statutory provisions secure privacy rights in limited contexts.
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA),61 for
example, contains provisions that protect the confidentiality—and therefore the
privacy—of a patient’s medical records.62 But a law cannot change cultural habits
and concerns (or, in the case of privacy, a lack of concern). In practice, HIPAA’s
privacy rule simply reduces to a new patient being furnished with a sheet of paper
from her medical care provider stating the HIPAA privacy protection rule but then
immediately asking for a general release so that the provider may communicate
with medical insurance companies, and others, to obtain benefits on behalf of the
patient. Virtually all patients simply sign this form, thereby waiving a substantial
portion of their HIPAA rights. Physicians’ offices do not invite discussion or
negotiation about the content or scope of these waivers. Although I have never
personally tested the proposition, one suspects that if a would-be patient were to
refuse to sign the waiver form as written, she would probably be denied service.

60. But cf. X and Y v. Netherlands, App. No. 8978/80, 8 Eur. H.R. Rep. 235, 239–41,
¶¶ 21–27 (1985) (holding that the privacy rights guaranteed by Article 8 of the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms include
protection against private behavior that burdens or transgresses Article 8 because signatory
states have a duty to secure Convention rights within society generally and not simply a duty
not to violate them directly through government action). In fact, many European nations,
including Germany, maintain legal systems under which the state itself not only must refrain
from violating fundamental human rights but which require the state to promote respect for
these interests within society more generally. See Krotoszynski, Defamation in the Digital
Age, supra note 51, at 349–50 (discussing the German doctrine of secondary effect and the
Basic Law’s (Grundgesetz) application to purely private interactions between
nongovernmental entities); see also David P. Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional
Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 864 (1986) (discussing and distinguishing legal systems that
observe constitutional rights solely in negative terms, i.e., as running solely against the state
itself, and legal systems that recognize and enforce “positive” constitutional rights, i.e.,
rights that the state has an affirmative duty to secure for its citizens).
61. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191,
110 Stat. 1936 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq.) (codified at various points as
amendments or additions to the Social Security Act). For a skeptical overview of HIPAA’s
effectiveness at securing patient privacy, see Brian Zoeller, Note, Health and Human
Services’ Privacy Proposal: A Failed Attempt at Health Information Privacy Protection, 40
BRANDEIS L.J. 1065 (2002).
62. For a discussion of the privacy protections that the HIPAA privacy rule provides,
see Health Information Privacy, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES,
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/consumers/index.html.
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To be clear, one should not understate the value of HIPAA or other statutory
protections of privacy interests against nongovernmental actors; rather, the point is
that even when legislative bodies in the United States act to convey privacy
protections by statute, these statutory rights often lack cultural salience and quickly
morph into relatively meaningless forms of legal boilerplate.
Again, the contrast with Europe seems striking. For example, European websites
are far more serious about representing the private nature of the transaction. As
Professor Paul Ohm notes, the European Union’s (EU) data privacy regulations are
“famously privacy-protective.”63 Undoubtedly, this greater respect for securing
personal information and data is not solely the product of voluntary self-regulation
but instead relates rather directly to the European Commission’s extensive
“directives” (administrative regulations) on protecting the privacy of personal
information.64 Even so, however, the question of the chicken and the egg remains:
are privacy regulations stricter in Europe because of cultural expectations, or do the
regulations themselves help to order and shape privacy expectations of individuals
residing within the EU? Whatever the precise causation, European privacy
protections at the EU level are much broader, and stricter, than the corresponding
enactments at the federal and state level in the United States.65
Moreover, the comprehensive protection of personal honor and dignity, as
significant legal concepts within the domestic tort law of many European nations,
also reflects a much higher social importance for the protection of privacy interests
in Europe than in the United States. In other words, Europeans seem to take far
more seriously the need to secure nondisclosure rights against other citizens and
nongovernmental entities than do most U.S. citizens (and the federal and state
governments).
The degree of the public/private disjunction in privacy concerns remains strong
in the contemporary United States. For example, the Bush administration’s
domestic spying program was remarkably controversial;66 both average citizens and

63. Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of
Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1704 (2010).
64. Council Directive 95/46, on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L281) 31
(EU). The European Union is currently drafting a new directive that will revise, update, and
expand its privacy regulations. European Comm’n, Proposal for a Regulation of the
European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data (General Data
Protection Regulation) (2011), available at http://www.statewatch.org/news/2011/dec/eucom-draft-dp-reg-inter-service-consultation.pdf (proposing a new data protection
regulation); see Steven C. Bennett, The “Right to Be Forgotten”: Reconciling EU and US
Perspectives, 30 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 161, 178 (2012) (noting that the EU is revising and
updating its privacy directive); Peter Swire, Social Networks, Privacy, and Freedom of
Association: Data Protection vs. Data Empowerment, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1371, 1374 (2012)
(same).
65. See Cate, supra note 54, at 196 (“When compared with the omnibus, centralized
data protection of the EU directive and member states’ national laws, U.S. privacy protection
stands in stark contrast and to some observers seems to pale altogether.”). For a general
overview of European privacy protection regulations, see id. at 180–95.
66. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., A Man for All Seasons: Judge Frank M. Johnson Jr.
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members of Congress were greatly angered by the notion that the government
might be wiretapping telephone calls between U.S. residents and citizens of another
nation.67 Congress conducted oversight hearings and extensive press coverage of
the controversial policy reported on each new disclosure regarding the program; the
program and its discovery were, in fact, front page news in the nation’s leading
newspapers.68
In the end, however, rather than condemn the domestic spying program or
punish those responsible for it, Congress instead passed legislation in 2008 that
conveyed retroactive immunity on telephone companies that facilitated the
domestic spying program—with the support of then-Senator Barack Obama.69 In
other words, U.S. politicians saw more political upside in granting blanket
immunity to the telephone companies that cooperated with a warrantless
wiretapping program after the fact (despite the absence of any judicial safeguards
for the program) than in creating mandatory new privacy protections that would
force the federal executive branch to seek judicial approval for such monitoring
programs or, looking at the question from the nongovernmental side of the ledger,
imposing civil liability on the private telecommunications companies that
voluntarily cooperated with the arguably unlawful domestic spying programs.
Moreover, ostensibly “liberal” or “progressive” politicians, including the putative
nominee of the Democratic Party for President, supported this approach.70
Such an outcome in Europe, if not completely unthinkable, comes very close to
being so. This is not because governments in Europe are intrinsically more virtuous
or have a higher regard for freedom, but rather because the political consequences
of such a program would be utterly disastrous. Once again, culture informs law.

and the Quest to Secure the Rule of Law, 61 ALA. L. REV. 165, 169–72 (2009); W. Bradley
Wendel, Government Lawyers, Democracy, and the Rule of Law, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1333,
1338–41 (2009).
67. See, e.g., Emily Arthur Cardy, Note, The Unconstitutionality of the Protect America
Act of 2007, 18 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 171, 171–73 (2008).
68. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1; see Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 451 F. Supp. 2d
1215 (D. Or. 2006); Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Demands
Records About Warrantless Spying by National Security Agency (Dec. 20, 2005), available
at http://www.aclu.org/safefree/spying/23150prs20051220.html.
69. See Shailagh Murray, Obama Joins Fellow Senators in Passing New Wiretapping
Measure, WASH. POST, July 10, 2008, at A6 (noting Senate passage of “legislation to
overhaul government eavesdropping rules in terrorism and espionage cases and [that]
effectively granted immunity to telecommunications companies that participated in a secret
domestic spying program, ending a contentious debate that has raged for more than two
years” and reporting that “[a]mong the 69 senators who voted ‘yes’ on final passage was
Barack Obama”).
70. See James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Early Test for Obama on Domestic Spying
Views, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2008, at A17 (“As a presidential candidate, he condemned the
N.S.A. operation as illegal, and threatened to filibuster a bill that would grant the
government expanded surveillance powers and provide immunity to phone companies that
helped in the Bush administration’s program of wiretapping without warrants. But Mr.
Obama switched positions and ultimately supported the measure in the Senate, angering
liberal supporters who accused him of bowing to pressure from the right.”).
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Similarly, most U.S. users of commercial web browsers and Internet service
providers do not think twice about the placement of cookies on their computers
(including “zombie” cookies that cannot be removed or eradicated by simply
clearing a web browser’s memory cache), the tracking of their searches and
purchases, or other commoditization of their use of the Internet. The Wall Street
Journal has run a series of investigative journalism pieces on privacy that
document systematic and widespread privacy abuses by various segments of the
web;71 this muckraking, at least to date, appears to have landed with a thud.
Although the Obama administration and some members of Congress have proposed
an Internet users’ Bill of Rights,72 including some mandatory privacy protections,
nothing has happened.73
Again, in the United States, the notion of an invasion of privacy generally runs
against the federal government, not so much against private companies such as
Microsoft or Google. As a consequence, very little data privacy protection—even
of a sort that would probably not implicate the First Amendment—exists at either
the federal or state level. Instead, to a remarkable—indeed unwise—degree, in the
contemporary United States we rely almost entirely on market competition to
ensure even a modicum of privacy protection for our personal information, data,
and Internet browsing habits.

71. Julia Angwin, Big Issues: Technology (A Special Report)—How Much Should
People Worry About the Loss of Online Privacy?, WALL ST. J., Nov. 15, 2011, at B7; Julia
Angwin, Latest in Web Tracking: Stealthy ‘Supercookies,’ WALL ST. J., Aug. 18, 2011, at
A1; Julia Angwin & Jeremy Singer-Vine, What They Know: A Wall Street Journal
Investigation: The Selling of You, WALL ST. J., Apr. 7, 2012, at C1; Julia Angwin & Emily
Steel, What They Know: A Wall Street Journal Investigation: Web’s Hot New Commodity:
Privacy, WALL ST. J., Feb. 28, 2011, at A1; Julia Angwin & Jennifer Valentino-DeVries,
What They Know: A Wall Street Journal Investigation: Race is On to ‘Fingerprint’ Phones,
PCs, WALL ST. J., Dec. 1, 2010, at A1; Emily Steel & Julia Angwin, On the Web’s Cutting
Edge, Anonymity in Name Only, WALL ST. J., Aug. 4, 2010, at A1. It bears noting that the
Wall Street Journal’s excellent investigative journalism efforts with respect to online privacy
appear to be, if not unique, then very close to it. One wonders if traditional media companies
that currently seek to benefit from online revenue streams have something of a conflict of
interest with respect to reporting on how websites maximize revenue by minimizing users’
privacy and data protection.
72. See Hayley Tsukayama, What’s the ‘Privacy Bill of Rights’?, WASH. POST, Feb. 24,
2012, at A11 (describing the Obama administration’s proposal and the seven general
principles that legislation embodies, including “individual control,” “transparency,” “respect
for context,” “security,” “access and accuracy,” “focused collection,” and “accountability”);
Jennifer Valentino-DeVries & Emily Steel, President Pushes Privacy, WALL ST. J., Mar. 16,
2011, at B1 (“The Obama administration plans to ask Congress Wednesday to pass a
‘privacy bill of rights’ to protect Americans from intrusive data gathering, amid growing
concern about the tracking and targeting of Internet users.”).
73. See Jasmin Melvin, Web Privacy Guarantee? Critics Remain Skeptical, CHI. TRIB.,
Feb. 24, 2012, § 2, at 3; Edward Wyatt, F.T.C. and White House Push for Online Privacy
Laws, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2012, at B8. To be sure, some commentators were skeptical of
this legislation’s prospects for success from the beginning. See Tsukayama, supra note 72
(“But there are some doubts about whether comprehensive legislation will make it through
Congress, particularly in an election year. There are a handful of privacy bills that have been
introduced this session but have failed to gain much traction.”).
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And, again, if one broadens the question and asks, “in the United States, could
government act to secure privacy, dignity, and personal honor from private
invasion?,” the answer would be no in many important circumstances. With respect
to public officials, public figures, and information that relates to a matter of public
concern, the media would have a strong claim to constitutional protection for the
dissemination of this information, even if it were purloined, provided that the
media entity publishing the information was not itself responsible or complicit in
the theft of the information.
A contretemps involving the disclosure of Justice Antonin Scalia’s personal
information, including his home address, phone number, bank, and e-mail address
demonstrates just how deeply U.S. antipathy to privacy (as nondisclosure)
protection seems to run. At an academic conference, Justice Scalia made public
comments disparaging of the need for privacy protections;74 in turn, Joel
Reidenberg, a Fordham Law School professor, tasked his seminar students with
using public databases to learn all that they could find about Justice Scalia.75 The
results were remarkable: “[a]mong its contents are Nino’s home address, his home
phone number, the movies he likes, his food preferences, his wife’s personal e-mail
address, and ‘photos of his lovely grandchildren.’”76
After a popular legal blog, Above the Law,77 posted a story about the seminar
students’ success in ferreting out confidential information about Justice Scalia, the
Justice responded publicly to the breach of his privacy:
I stand by my remark at the Institute of American and Talmudic Law
conference that it is silly to think that every single datum about my life
is private. I was referring, of course, to whether every single datum
about my life deserves privacy protection in law.
It is not a rare phenomenon that what is legal may also be quite
irresponsible. That appears in the First Amendment context all the time.
What can be said often should not be said. Prof. Reidenberg’s exercise
is an example of perfectly legal, abominably poor judgment. Since he
was not teaching a course in judgment, I presume he felt no
responsibility to display any.78

74. See Kashmir Hill, What Fordham Knows About Justice Scalia, ABOVE THE LAW
(Apr. 22, 2009, 5:30 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2009/04/what-fordham-knows-aboutjustice-scalia/. Justice Scalia mocked the notion that privacy laws should secure personal
information against involuntary disclosure: “‘Every single datum about my life is private?
That’s silly,’ Scalia [said].” Id.
75. See Kashmir Hill, Justice Scalia Responds to Fordham Privacy Invasion!, ABOVE
THE LAW (Apr. 29, 2009, 9:52 AM), http://abovethelaw.com/2009/04/justice-scaliaresponds-to-fordham-privacy-invasion/.
76. Hill, supra note 74.
77. ABOVE THE LAW, http://abovethelaw.com; see also Carol Beggy & Mark Shanahan,
Names, BOS. GLOBE, May 10, 2008, at B10 (describing Above the Law as a “widely read
legal blog”).
78. Hill, supra note 75.

2013]

THE POLYSEMY OF PRIVACY

899

Thus, even after a group of law students demonstrated that important personal data
could easily be obtained and published from public databases, Justice Scalia stood
by his guns, arguing that the law should not universally protect personal
information from involuntary disclosure. This provides useful evidence of how
deep the indifference (antipathy?) toward privacy rights runs in the contemporary
United States.
III. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL DISAGREEMENTS
Points of tangent plainly do exist about the meaning and scope of the right of
privacy. Most legal systems have incorporated a set of tort rules designed to
safeguard personal reputation, for example, whether denominated rules about
“privacy,” “human dignity,” or even a more generalized “right to free development
of the personality.”79 In the United States, Canada, Australia, and Western Europe,
a general consensus exists that a just society should offer some measure of
protection, under the civil law, to each person’s interest in reputation, dignity, and
privacy.80 So far, so good—when we talk about privacy as protection of reputation
and human dignity, we are speaking about a common commitment, something that,
if not a universal human value, comes quite close to it.
Even here, however, our ability to speak meaningfully about privacy suffers a
substantial setback from the radically different baselines that inform our respective
domestic legal systems’ treatment of this interest when interests associated with
privacy and human dignity conflict with values associated with expressive
freedoms, such as the right to free speech or to a free press. In the United States, the
imperative value of freedom of speech serves as a kind of absolute trump card, and
state tort law protections routinely fail when challenged on First Amendment
grounds.
Consider, for example, the recent Phelps81 decision from the Supreme Court of
the United States. The Reverend Fred Phelps and members of his Westboro Baptist
Church (“Westboro”) hail from Topeka, Kansas and are active proselytizers; Phelps

79. See Paul M. Schwartz & Karl-Nikolaus Peifer, Prosser’s Privacy and the German
Right of Personality: Are Four Privacy Torts Better than One Unitary Concept?, 98 CALIF.
L. REV. 1925 (2010); see also GRUNDGESETZFÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND
[GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] [BASIC LAW], May 23, 1949, BGBl. I, art. 1–2 (Ger.).
80. See generally NEW DIMENSIONS IN PRIVACY LAW: INTERNATIONAL AND
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 1–5, 11–31, 60–90, 154–183, 202–228 (Andrew T. Kenyon &
Megan Richardson eds., 2006) (discussing privacy law and principles in Australia, Canada,
Germany, the United Kingdom, and in Western Europe more generally); Daniel B. Garrie,
Maureen Duffy-Lewis, Rebecca Wong & Richard L. Gillespie, Data Protection: The
Challenges Facing Social Networking, 6 BYU INT’L L. & MGMT. REV. 127, 129–30, 136–41
(2010) (discussing existence of data protection regimes potentially applicable to data located
on social networking sites in Australia, Canada, Germany, Sweden, the United Kingdom,
and under the regulations of the European Union); Thomas J. Smedinghoff, It’s All About
Trust: The Expanding Scope of Security Obligations in Global Privacy and E-Transactions
Law, 16 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 1, 15–16 (2007) (noting the existence of “omnibus” privacy
protection regimes in many nations, including “Canada, Japan, Argentina, South Korea,
Hong Kong, and Australia”).
81. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011).
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and his congregation firmly believe that God is punishing the United States for
tolerating an increasingly licentious society. In particular, greater social and legal
tolerance for sexual minorities seems to cause Phelps and his followers a
tremendous degree of anxiety. In order to call attention to the imperative of
arresting these cultural and legal trends, Westboro stages highly offensive targeted
pickets at the funerals of deceased military personnel.82
Albert Snyder’s son, Marine Lance Corporal Matthew Snyder, was killed while
on active duty in Iraq; his funeral took place in Westminster, Maryland.83 Phelps
and six of his congregants traveled to Westminster for the specific purpose of
protesting at Matthew Snyder’s funeral. Brandishing signs with slogans like “God
Hates the USA/Thank God for 9/11,” “God Hates Fags,” and “Thank God for Dead
Soldiers,”84 the protest took place contemporaneously with, and proximate to,
Matthew Snyder’s funeral services.85
Following Westboro’s offensive funeral picket, Albert Snyder initiated a civil
tort action seeking compensatory and punitive damages for “defamation, publicity
given to private life, intentional infliction of emotional distress, intrusion upon
seclusion, and civil conspiracy.”86 The jury found for Snyder on his claims for
intentional infliction of emotional distress, intrusion upon seclusion, and civil
conspiracy, awarding $2.9 million in compensatory damages and $8 million in
punitive damages; the federal district judge subsequently reduced the punitive
damages award to $2.1 million, but otherwise upheld the jury’s verdict.87 On direct
appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit completely invalidated the
jury award, holding that the speech at issue enjoyed full protection under the First
Amendment.88 The U.S. Supreme Court granted review and affirmed the Court of
Appeals.
Writing for the 8-1 majority, Chief Justice Roberts held that the First
Amendment essentially immunizes speech in a public forum, related to a matter of
public concern, from serving as the basis for tort liability. On the first point,
whether the speech related to a matter of public concern, Roberts noted that
“Westboro had been actively engaged in speaking on the subjects addressed in its
picketing long before it became aware of Matthew Snyder, and there can be no
serious claim that Westboro’s picketing did not represent its ‘honestly believed’
views on public issues.”89 Having decided this issue in favor of Phelps, the
remaining question was whether the First Amendment shielded Westboro’s speech
from civil liability for invasion of privacy.
Chief Justice Roberts found that the speech enjoyed the full protection of the
First Amendment, and held that a standard for civil liability based on the

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
(2011).
89.

See id. at 1213.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1214.
Id.
See Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 221–22 (4th Cir. 2009), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 1207
Phelps, 131 S. Ct. at 1217 (citing Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 73 (1964)).
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“outrageousness” of speech comes too close to empowering a “heckler[’s] veto.”90
He explained:
Given that Westboro’s speech was at a public place on a matter of
public concern, that speech is entitled to “special protection” under the
First Amendment. Such speech cannot be restricted simply because it is
upsetting or arouses contempt. “If there is a bedrock principle
underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not
prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea
itself offensive or disagreeable.”91
This outcome appears to leave little, if any, breathing room for the application of
privacy torts, at least if the speech at issue falls within the rubric of a “matter of
public concern,” is otherwise lawful, and takes place in a traditional public forum.
Moreover, the gravamen of both the intentional infliction of emotional distress
and privacy claims relates to the outrageousness of the speech or the intrusion upon
privacy. Chief Justice Roberts specifically rejected this legal standard, at least in
this context, because “‘[o]utrageousness,’ however, is a highly malleable standard
with ‘an inherent subjectiveness about it which would allow a jury to impose
liability on the basis of the jurors’ tastes or views, or perhaps on the basis of their
dislike of a particular expression.’”92 That a civil jury might take such a step by
imposing civil liability on an unpopular speaker or group constitutes an
“unacceptable” risk and, accordingly, “the jury verdict imposing tort liability on
Westboro for intentional infliction of emotional distress must be set aside.”93
The Court then proceeded to disallow the imposition of liability based on the
tort of intrusion upon seclusion or civil conspiracy.94 Chief Justice Roberts rejected
the argument that mourners at the funeral of a dead soldier constitute a captive
audience and the related argument that the state has a right to protect such a captive
audience from outrageous or offensive speech.95
The net effect of Phelps is to extend the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan96 line of
cases displacing state tort law principles to reach highly offensive, targeted

90. Id. at 1219; see HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 140–
41, 145 (1965). Professor Kalven has generally been credited with inventing and first using
the concept of the “heckler’s veto.” See Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, supra note
58, at 1416–17. However, the concept of a “heckler’s veto” arguably related back to Justice
Douglas’s majority opinion in Terminiello and Justice Black’s dissenting opinion in Feiner.
See Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 326–29 (1951) (Black, J., dissenting); Terminiello v.
Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4–6 (1949).
91. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. at 1219 (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989)).
92. Id. (quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988)).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1219–20.
95. See id.
96. 376 U.S. 254 (1964); see also Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496
(1991); Hustler, 485 U.S. 46; Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986); Time,
Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
For a thoughtful—and highly influential—discussion of the central importance of the New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan line of cases to the project of democratic self-government, see
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protests, if the speech at issue relates to a matter of public concern. More
specifically, Phelps has the effect of extending Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell97
to include plaintiffs who are not public officials or public figures, but whose cause
of action involves liability premised on speech relating to a matter of public
concern. This represents a major displacement of traditional state tort law to
accommodate an “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open”98 debate about public
affairs.
Yet, the speech here, as Justice Alito observed in dissent,99 seemed intentionally
targeted to inflict maximum emotional pain, and to do so in a way that seriously
intruded on a quintessentially private moment—the funeral of a deceased family
member. Justice Alito argued that “[i]n order to have a society in which public
issues can be openly and vigorously debated, it is not necessary to allow the
brutalization of innocent victims like petitioner [Snyder].”100 The question that
presents itself, then, is whether a commitment to the freedom of expression requires
a polity to forbear from enforcing, whether through criminal or civil law,
mandatory civility norms designed to protect the privacy, dignity, and personal
honor of its citizens.
To be sure, the Phelps majority sees this as a relatively easy question. Chief
Justice Roberts claims that an open and free marketplace of ideas requires that civil
juries enjoy no greater power to censor than local police or city officials:
Speech is powerful. It can stir people to action, move them to tears of
both joy and sorrow, and—as it did here—inflict great pain. On the
facts before us, we cannot react to that pain by punishing the speaker.
As a Nation we have chosen a different course—to protect even hurtful
speech on public issues to ensure that we do not stifle public debate.
That choice requires that we shield Westboro from tort liability for its
picketing in this case.101
But, to a large degree, the Phelps majority opinion, as well as the larger New York
Times line of precedent, seems to assume that the costs of outrageous, and even
objectively false, speech must be borne by those against whom it is directed. Yet,
this constitutes a very distinctly American solution to the problem of reconciling a

Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on “The Central Meaning of the First
Amendment,” 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191. Kalven famously quoted Alexander Meiklejohn,
another iconic scholar of the First Amendment, as describing the Sullivan decision as an
“occasion for dancing in the streets.” Id. at 221 n.125.
97. 485 U.S. at 50–51.
98. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270.
99. See Phelps, 131 S. Ct. at 1222–26 (Alito, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 1229. But cf. Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse:
Outrageous Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV.
L. REV. 601, 624–32 (1990) (arguing against imposing liability for speech based on an
“outrageousness” standard not because highly offensive speech has significant social value,
nor because the standard is too inherently subjective, but rather because use of an
“outrageousness” metric “would enable a single community to use the authority of the state
to confine speech within its own notions of propriety”).
101. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. at 1220.
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commitment to the freedom of speech and of the press, on the one hand, with a
commitment to safeguarding privacy and dignity values, on the other.
Without belaboring the point, the outcome in Phelps would likely have been
very different outside the United States. For example, the House of Lords (now the
Supreme Court of the United Kingdom)102 has held that supermodel Naomi
Campbell, could recover damages associated with publication of a photograph of
her leaving a Narcotics Anonymous meeting, in the heart of London, even though
Ms. Campbell was standing on a public street, plainly visible to any passersby.103
Thus, in the United Kingdom, even a public figure, standing on a public street, can
possess a legally protected interest in privacy and nondisclosure.
Along similar lines, the European Court of Human Rights (“European Court”)
has held that Article 8 of the European Convention protects a right of privacy held
by a public official (a person in line to the throne of Monaco), in public places and
while at public events.104 Princess Caroline of Monaco is certainly a public figure,
even if she is not a public official, yet she nevertheless has an equal claim to the
protection of her privacy under the European Convention on Human Rights.
The European Court explained that the freedom of speech and the press did not
have any necessary priority over the right of privacy.105 Citing and quoting a
resolution of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the European
Court noted “the importance of every person’s right to privacy, and of the right to
freedom of expression, [i]s fundamental,” but also emphasized that this does not
mean that freedom of expression must always take precedence regardless of the
precise context.106 Rather, because these fundamental rights “are of equal value” it
is not possible simply to find that speech and press rights will routinely overbear

102. See Cassell Bryan-Low & Jess Bravin, A U.K. Court Without the Wigs—New
Supreme Bench, Patterned on America’s, Stirs Debate, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 2009, at A1
(reporting that “[t]his month, the U.K. replaced its Law Lords—a committee of noblemen
that served as the highest tribunal for much of Britain—with the new Supreme Court of the
United Kingdom,” patterned on the Supreme Court of the United States and noting that
“[f]or the first time, the U.K.’s highest court is fully separated, American-style, from
Parliament and its legislative function”).
103. See Campbell v. MGN Ltd., [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 A.C. (H.L.) 457 (appeal
taken from Eng.).
104. See Von Hannover v. Germany, App. No. 53920/00, 40 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 5–6,
¶¶ 10–17, 28–29, ¶¶ 76–78 (2005). The publication of three sets of photographs was at issue
in Von Hannover, including photographs of Princess Caroline having lunch at a French
restaurant with an actor, riding a horse, with her children, shopping, riding a bicycle, skiing,
playing tennis, and at a beach. See id. at 5–6, ¶¶ 10–17.
105. Id. at 25, ¶ 58 (holding that “[t]hat protection of private life has to be balanced
against the freedom of expression”); id. at 25, ¶ 60 (noting that the European Court of
Human Rights has “had to balance the protection of private life against the freedom of
expression” in several cases presenting a conflict between these interests).
106. Id. at 18–19, ¶ 42 (citing and quoting Resolution 1165, clause 11 (1998) of the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on the right to privacy); see also id. at 24–
25, ¶¶ 58–60 (holding that when privacy interests conflict with free speech and free press
rights, which the European Convention also expressly protects, the European Court must
balance these interests against each other taking into account the purpose and proper scope
of all three fundamental rights).
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privacy interests.107 Moreover, even celebrities and socialites “enjoy a ‘legitimate
expectation’ of protection of and respect for their private life.”108
The European Court rejected the notion that the rights of free speech and a free
press should control with respect to publication of the photographs at issue:
The Court considers that a fundamental distinction needs to be made
between reporting facts—even controversial ones—capable of
contributing to a debate in a democratic society relating to politicians in
the exercise of their functions, for example, and reporting details of the
private life of an individual who, moreover, as in this case, does not
exercise official functions.109
Because “the sole purpose [of publishing the photographs] was to satisfy the
curiosity of a particular readership regarding the details of the applicant’s private
life, [publication of the photographs] cannot be deemed to contribute to any debate
of general interest to society despite the applicant being known to the public.”110
Given this reasoning and the limited scope of free expression and free press
rights—rights limited essentially to matters directly associated with democratic
self-government—it necessarily followed that Princess Caroline’s privacy claim
trumped the media’s speech and press claims.111 “[T]he decisive factor in balancing
the protection of private life against freedom of expression should lie in the
contribution that the published photos and articles make to a debate of general
interest.”112 A mere “commercial interest” in publishing photographs and articles
“must, in the Court’s view, yield to [Princess Caroline’s] right to the effective
protection of her private life.”113 Thus, Germany had a duty under the European
Convention to provide legal protection to Princess Caroline against the German
media outlets that sought to publish the photographs.114

107. Id. at 19, ¶ 42 (quoting and citing Resolution 1165, clause 11 (1998) of the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on the right to privacy). The Council of
Europe is the organization from which the European Court receives its mandate and judicial
authority. Its membership includes virtually all nations in Western and Eastern Europe, as
well as Turkey. For an excellent overview of the European Court and the European
Convention, including the history, structure, organization, and procedures of the European
Court, see THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1–94
(Pieter van Dijk et al. eds., 4th ed. 2006).
108. Von Hannover, 40 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 27, ¶ 69.
109. Id. at 26, ¶ 63.
110. Id. at 27, ¶ 65.
111. See id. at 26–29, ¶ 61–78.
112. Id. at 28, ¶ 76.
113. Id. at 28, ¶ 77.
114. See id. at 29, ¶ 78 (holding that “in the Court’s opinion the criteria established by the
domestic courts were not sufficient to ensure the effective protection of the applicant’s
private life and she should, in the circumstances of the case, have had a ‘legitimate
expectation’ of protection of her private life”). Von Hannover thus involves a positive
obligation on the part of Germany to regulate private behavior more effectively to secure
privacy interests in contemporary society. The European Court acknowledged this aspect of
the dispute, noting that signatories to the European Convention incur legal obligations that
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To be sure, it is certainly true that the European Convention contains an express
clause securing a right of privacy. Article 8 provides that:
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his
home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise
of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security,
public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals,
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.115
In this respect, then, the European Court was working against a legal backdrop that
differs from the U.S. Constitution. And, when two express constitutional rights
conflict, some sort of accommodation, usually through balancing, must be made.116
Nevertheless, one would be affording too much explanatory force to text to
suggest that the presence of Article 8 explains fully the differences between Phelps,
on the one hand, and Von Hannover, on the other. These rules reflect deep-seated
cultural values in the United States and in Europe. In the United States, a pervasive
distrust of government helps to sustain a regime of near-absolute protection for the
freedom of speech, whereas in the rest of the world, citizens repose more trust,
more reflexively, in government and its agents, and accordingly tolerate higher
levels of government regulation of speech.117
My point in discussing the displacement of tort law to advance free speech
values in the United States is to demonstrate that even if we could sort out the
many difficult and pressing definitional issues that plague the concept of privacy,
we might well find that, once the dust settles, fundamental and irreconcilable
differences remain that simply cannot be bridged. In the United States, the free
speech project enjoys if not an absolute priority, then something very close to it. It
is quite doubtful that the federal or state governments could enact and enforce rules
that require individuals to observe mandatory civility norms. By way of contrast,
provisions like Article 8 arguably require signatories of the European Convention
to maintain legal rules that adequately safeguard the privacy rights not only of
ordinary people, but of politicians and movie stars as well.
In this sense, then, although privacy might well be a universal value, substantial
and probably insurmountable obstacles exist to working out a set of rules that
would operationalize the concept transnationally. We can all agree that privacy is
important and should be protected, but from that point forward, the sledding will be
very heavy indeed.
“may involve the adoption of measures designed to secure respect for private life even in the
sphere of the relations of individuals between themselves.” Id. at 25, ¶ 57.
115. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 8,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, C.E.T.S. 5.
116. See AHARON BARAK, THE JUDGE IN A DEMOCRACY 164–66 (2006); Aharon Barak,
Foreword: A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 HARV.
L. REV. 19, 93–97, 161–62 (2002); Aharon Barak, Proportionality and Principled
Balancing, 4 LAW & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 1 (2010).
117. See Krotoszynski, Questioning the Value of Dissent, supra note 56, at 213, 219–29.
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At the same time, however, simply agreeing to disagree seems an unacceptable
solution to the problem of conflicting human rights norms, in that simply ignoring
the different relevant weights and priorities will lead different jurisdictions to
afford or withhold protection for speech and press that originates in one place (say
the United States), but has significant effects in another (say Germany or France).
A glaring, indeed compelling, need exists for clearer shared rules regarding both
the scope of privacy (dignity) rights and also greater clarity about appropriate
jurisdictional lines for enforcing those rules.
Although the claim is certainly subject to objection, rethinking and perhaps
disaggregating the concept of privacy into more discrete and easily definable
packets or sticks of rights might help point the way to a shared solution. Just as
property is not used as a generic legal construct, free and clear of particularized
applications, so too privacy is a concept that cries out for specificity regarding the
precise interests the concept encompasses and also the scope of those interests. We
should think about privacy not as a single thing or unitary whole, but rather as a
disaggregated bundle of sticks, various and sundry discrete interests, that all in one
way or another help to secure legitimate claims to autonomy, nondisclosure, and
self-definition.
IV. THE NOMENCLATURE OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE COLLECTIVE: PRIVACY AS
INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY AND DIGNITY AS COMMUNITY RESPECT
Just as the public/private distinction helps to inform the framing of privacy in
the United States and in Europe, the concept of autonomy as privacy, rather than
human dignity, seems to reflect important cultural differences between the United
States and the wider world. These differences, moreover, also seem to implicate the
polity’s overall trust in government to use discretionary censorial powers wisely
and fairly—rather than arbitrarily and unjustly.
In general, in the United States we speak of a right of privacy, rather than a right
of human dignity118 or a right to the free development of the personality.119 This is
not accidental. Although instances exist of the U.S. Supreme Court invoking
“dignity” as an aspect of constitutionally protected liberty,120 these are the

118. See GRUNDGESETZFÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG]
[BASIC LAW], May 23, 1949, BGBl. I, art. 1(1) (Ger.) [hereinafter BASIC LAW].
119. Id. art. 2(1).
120. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (“It suffices for us to
acknowledge that adults may choose to enter upon this relationship in the confines of their
homes and their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons. When
sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be
but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring.”); see also Leslie Meltzer Henry,
The Jurisprudence of Dignity, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 169, 171–72 (2011) (noting that the
Supreme Court’s “use of dignity is . . . on the rise” but cautioning that “its importance,
meaning, and function are commonly presupposed but rarely articulated”). Professor Henry
argues that “few concepts dominate modern constitutional jurisprudence more than dignity
does without appearing in the Constitution.” Id. at 172. This may well be true, but the
emergence of dignity as a constitutionally relevant construct in majority opinions is a recent
phenomenon and it is unclear whether a majority of the Justices will continue to embrace
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exceptions that prove the more general rule; rights, in the United States, for the
most part belong to individuals and not groups. The nomenclature of privacy
reflects a legal and cultural focus on the individual’s ability to claim a sphere of
autonomy—a realm of private action that cannot justly be regulated by the state.121
By way of contrast, in other industrial democracies, the conceptualization of
human rights often has a more collective, or communal, cast.122 This does not mean
that individuals do not possess or exercise rights, but rather that rights are
something that the society as a whole conveys not only to the individual but also to
minority groups (whether defined by race, ethnicity, language, religion, or some
other characteristic that makes a group seem “other” from the perspective of the
dominant group within the society). Moreover, the recognition of group interests as
constitutional interests can have important effects on the scope of rights when
individuals attempt to exercise rights, such as the freedom of speech, in ways that
impose significant costs on particular groups. Thus, constitutional recognition of
rights as inhering in a group or community can mean a reduced scope for human
rights as a means of empowering and enabling individual autonomy.
Germany provides an instructive example. Article 1 of the Basic Law provides
that “[h]uman dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty
of all state authority.”123 This obligation is paramount and when dignity conflicts
with other fundamental rights, the German Federal Constitutional Court, the
highest judicial entity in Germany, will give priority to securing and advancing
human dignity. This commitment to human dignity is buttressed by the right to free
development of the human personality, a human right secured in Article 2 of the
Basic Law.124 These two rights, working in tandem, support a rich jurisprudence
that secures the dignity interests of individuals, but also of groups within
contemporary German society. The concept of dignity, not unlike “the Force” in
Star Wars lore, plays a comprehensive animating role in German human rights

and deploy the concept to protect discrete liberty interests. Cf. id. at 171, 171 n.5 (noting that
Justice Brennan commonly used the term in his dissenting opinions). Professor Henry clearly
believes, however, that the concept of dignity presently does important independent
jurisprudential work in contemporary Supreme Court decisions and will likely continue to do
so. See id. at 181 (“The Court’s repeated appeals to dignity, particularly in majority opinions,
appear to parallel its greater willingness to proffer dignity as a substantive value animating
our constitutional rights.”).
121. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851
(1992) (joint opinion) (“At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these
matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of
the State.”).
122. See, e.g., Niemietz v. Germany, 16 Eur. H.R. Rep. 97, 111, ¶ 29 (1992) (noting that
“it would be too restrictive to limit the notion [of privacy] to an ‘inner circle’ in which the
individual may live his own personal life as he chooses and to exclude therefrom entirely the
outside world” and holding that “[r]espect for private life must also comprise to a certain
degree the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings”).
123. BASIC LAW, supra note 118, art.1(1).
124. Id. art. 2(1) (“Every person shall have the right to free development of his
personality insofar as he does not violate the rights of others or offend against the
constitutional order or the moral law.”).
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jurisprudence: everyone has a right to dignity and all groups have a right to dignity
as well.
The commitment to protecting an individual person’s dignitarian interests is
much broader in Germany than in the United States, which helps to provide useful
perspective on the scope of dignity in German law. All persons, including
incumbent politicians and celebrities, have an equal claim to the protection of their
constitutional right to dignity. Thus, the Federal Constitutional Court upheld an
injunction blocking distribution of a humor magazine that featured a parody of the
German equivalent of a state governor as a rutting pig.125 The cartoon, the court
said, denied the incumbent politician his right to human dignity, a right that has
paramount value under Germany’s Basic Law.
Significantly, the concept of dignity protects both individuals and groups within
German society. For example, the Federal Constitutional Court has upheld criminal
prohibitions against Holocaust Denial, or the “Auschwitz Lie,” because, in its view,
there is simply no value in false speech about a matter of historical record.126 This
decision also reflects core concerns rooted in protecting the dignity of those
murdered in the Holocaust, as well as their descendants.
Rejecting the defendant’s claim that a commitment to respecting the freedom of
speech must, of necessity, encompass the right publicly to deny the Holocaust, the
Federal Constitutional Court held that false factual assertions “‘cannot contribute
anything to the constitutionally presupposed formation of opinion’” and,
accordingly, do not enjoy any protection as “speech” under Article 5(1) of the
Basic Law (the German constitutional analogue to the First Amendment).127 The
court explained that “‘[v]iewed from this angle, incorrect information is not an
interest that merits protection.’”128
Freedom of speech in Germany does not extend to anti-Semitic speech, to
antidemocratic speech, or to speech that transgresses civility norms designed to
secure personal honor, reputation, and dignity.129 Moreover, this protection is not
limited to individuals, but extends to entire groups, such as persons serving in the

125. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] June 3, 1987, 75
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 369, 1988 (Ger.) (Strauss
Caricature Case), reprinted in 2 DECISIONS OF THE BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT—FEDERAL
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT—FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH, PART 2,
420, 420–21 (D.C. Umbach ed., I. Fraser et al. trans., 1998) [hereinafter DECISIONS OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT]; see KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 51, at 104–18
(discussing the balance that German constitutional law seeks to maintain between dignity
and free speech and noting that, in circumstances where these interests squarely conflict with
each other, safeguarding human dignity interests will trump protecting free speech).
126. See KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 51, at 126–27. But cf. Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky,
Where’s the Harm?: Free Speech and the Regulation of Lies, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1091,
1095–1100 (2008) (arguing that sound reasons exist for prohibiting government from
proclaiming historical truths and defending such truths through criminal sanctions and
arguing, from a practical perspective, that such regulations are not likely to convince those
who deny the Holocaust and “may have the unintended and paradoxical consequence of
strengthening the beliefs of Holocaust deniers, rather than weakening them”).
127. KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 51, at 127.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 93–130.
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armed forces or members of a particular racial or religious group. The right to
protection against outrageous verbal assault is both individual and communal.
The Tucholsky case130 also helps to demonstrate the communitarian conception
of the right to human dignity in Germany. A pacifist group, opposed to all forms of
war and military aggression, adopted and propagated the phrase “Soldiers are
Murderers” as a slogan; these protests then became the subject of a civil proceeding
to suppress distribution of the group’s printed protest materials via an injunction.
The phrase had been coined by Kurt Tucholsky, a writer and political satirist who
had opposed the Nazi Party’s rise to power in the 1930s; his iteration of the idea
was the slogan “Soldiers are Murderers.”131
The question presented for the German Federal Constitutional Court was
whether the phrase “Soldiers are Murderers” constituted protected political speech
or, instead, transgressed the dignity interests of those serving—and who had
served—in Germany’s military ranks. The lower courts found that the phrase
demeaned the dignity of those serving in Germany’s armed forces and prohibited
use of the slogan in public discourse.132
The Federal Constitutional Court reversed, holding that the phrase, at least in the
particular context presented, constituted protected political speech under Article
5(1) of the Basic Law.133 It reached this conclusion because the phrase was not
directed toward any particular soldier or group of soldiers.134 “Instead, [the wouldbe anti-war protestors] expressed a judgment about soldiers and about the
profession of soldier, which in some circumstances compels the killing of other
people.”135
The Federal Constitutional Court was very clear, however, in stating that had the
protestors directed the phrase at either any identifiable solider or group of soldiers,
an injunction against distribution of the speech would have been consistent with the
free speech guarantee of Article 5136—and perhaps even legally required to protect

130. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 10, 1995,
93 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 266, 1996 (Ger.)
(Tucholsky Case (Soldiers are Murderers Case)), reprinted in DECISIONS OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT, supra note 125, at 659.
131. Id. at 670; see also Michel Rosenfeld, Hate Speech in Constitutional Jurisprudence:
A Comparative Analysis, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1523, 1553 (2003) (noting that the slogan
“ha[s] a long pedigree in German history as it was the creation of the writer Kurt Tucholsky,
an Anti-Nazi pacifist of the 1930s who was stripped of his German citizenship in 1933”).
132. For a discussion of the procedural background of the case and the lower courts’
rulings, see DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 388–89 (2d ed. 1997).
133. Tucholsky, 93 BVERFGE 266, reprinted in DECISIONS OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT, supra note 125, at 676 (“The statements for which the
complainants were sentenced for defamation enjoy the protection of Art. 5(1), first sentence,
Basic Law.”).
134. See id. at 676–77.
135. Id. at 677.
136. Id. (“The complainants have not through their statements that soldiers are murderers
or potential murderers asserted that particular soldiers had in the past committed a murder.
Instead, they expressed a judgment about soldiers and about the profession of soldier, which
in some circumstances compels the killing of other people.” (emphasis added)). The Federal
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the right of human dignity set forth in Article 1.137 This is so because in Germany,
the state has not merely an obligation to refrain itself from violating the Basic Law,
but also has an affirmative, positive obligation to create social conditions within the
polity that secure fundamental rights more generally.138 Thus, it is not enough that
the government itself respects the dignity of all persons; instead, the government
has a duty to create a social environment in which all citizens enjoy the right to
human dignity within the general community.
To be sure, the Federal Constitutional Court has repeatedly emphasized that the
state itself does not possess a constitutionally cognizable interest in dignity (unlike
all human beings). Even so, the state has a duty and responsibility to ensure that
Constitutional Court explained that the convictions under review impermissibly rested on “a
value judgment, not an assertion of fact.” Id.; see also Guy E. Carmi, Dignity Versus Liberty:
The Two Western Cultures of Free Speech, 26 B.U. INT’L L.J. 277, 336–37 n.419 (2008)
(noting the Federal Constitutional Court “went to considerable lengths to interpret the
‘soldiers are murderers’ slogan, as not having been directed at specific soldiers, or the entire
German Army. It is apparent that a clear and unequivocal statement that ‘all currently
enlisted German soldiers are murderers’ is fully punishable under German law”); Ronald J.
Krotoszynski, Jr., A Comparative Perspective on the First Amendment: Free Speech,
Militant Democracy, and the Primacy of Dignity as a Preferred Constitutional Value in
Germany, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1549, 1573 (2004) (“[T]he Federal Constitutional Court has
upheld free speech claims only when the personal insult was not targeted at any particular
individual.”); Rosenfeld, supra note 131, at 1554 (noting that the Federal Constitutional
Court afforded the phrase protection because “the statements involved amounted to
constitutionally protected expressions of opinion rather than to the spreading of false facts”).
One should note that the Tucholsky decision, and an earlier decision by a panel of the
Federal Constitutional Court that reached the same conclusion, were highly controversial and
politically unpopular with many German politicians, as well as the German general public.
See KOMMERS, supra note 132, at 392–95 (discussing the highly negative reaction to the
Tucholsky decisions and proposed federal legislation to ban the use of Tucholsky’s slogan).
137. See Tucholsky, 93 BVERFGE 266, reprinted in DECISIONS OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT, supra note 125, at 677–79 (holding that the Basic Law’s protection
of human dignity and personal honor generally requires an effective remedy if a particular
soldier’s personal behavior or conduct had been falsely characterized in a public statement).
The outcome in this case turned on the impersonal—and non-targeted—nature of the phrase;
had the phrase “Soldiers are Murderers” been of and concerning a particular soldier, or
group of soldiers, the speech would not have been protected and instead the Basic Law
would have required the government to provide protection of the soldiers’ dignity interest.
See supra note 136.
138. See Edward J. Eberle, Public Discourse in Contemporary Germany, 47 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 797, 813 (1997) (describing the doctrine of secondary effect in Germany and
noting “there is effectively no difference in the standard of review applied by the
Constitutional Court to purely private or public law disputes”); Peter E. Quint, Free Speech
and Private Law in German Constitutional Theory, 48 MD. L. REV. 247, 273–74 (1989)
(noting that “[u]nder the German Basic Law, however, the fact that a certain dispute of
private law lies beyond where the state action line would be drawn under the United States
Constitution has no particular meaning” and that “the German constitution continues to have
an impact in cases in which no state action would be found under American law”); see also
Krotoszynski, supra note 136, at 1561–62 (discussing the absence of a state action doctrine
in Germany). For a very thoughtful discussion of how German constitutional theory justifies
application of constitutional values to disputes between purely private parties, see Quint,
supra, at 262–76.
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public support for the institutions of government does not fall to a level that would
create a risk to the survival of those institutions. Hence, although the Basic Law’s
free speech guarantee privileges defacing a German flag or mocking the national
anthem with a parody, a point exists at which calling the symbols of the nation into
scorn or contempt might run up against the Basic Law’s commitment to preserving
the project of democratic self-government.139 When and if expressive activity
reaches that point, the Federal Constitutional Court will withdraw constitutional
protection from the speech in order to safeguard the institutions of democratic selfgovernment. On the other hand, and as noted above, persons holding government
offices, unlike the state itself, enjoy constitutional protection of their interest in
dignity.
By way of contrast, in the United States more often than not we tend to frame
human rights in terms of the individual rather than the group. For example, in the
context of the Equal Protection Clause, the fact that a legislature composed
primarily of white men adopts an affirmative action program benefiting women or
racial minorities is quite irrelevant to the program’s constitutional status; a white
man who believes himself to have been disadvantaged by the program would be
quite free to object to it in federal court. Simply put, equal protection rights belong
to individuals, and not to groups.140
This construction of human rights as being rooted in protections for the
individual, rather than for groups, also finds expression in U.S. domestic free
speech law, albeit in a negative way. Not since 1952 in the Beauharnais case141 has
the Supreme Court of the United States sustained criminal group libel laws.142 Prior

139. See, e.g., Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Mar.
7, 1990, 81 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 298, 1990
(Ger.) (German National Anthem Case), reprinted in DECISIONS OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT, supra note 125, at 450; Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG]
[Federal Constitutional Court] Mar. 7, 1990, 81 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES
BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 278, 1990 (Ger.) (Flag Desecration Case),
reprinted in DECISIONS OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT, supra note 125, at 437.
See generally KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 51, at 117–18.
140. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (plurality opinion)
(explaining that the application of skepticism, congruence, and consistency rules for equal
protection review of all government race-based classifications “all derive from the basic
principle that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution protect persons, not
groups” (emphasis in original)). Cases permitting men to challenge gender-based
classifications that benefit women also reflect this approach. See, e.g., Miss. Univ. for
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723 (1982) (“That this statutory policy discriminates
against males rather than against females does not exempt it from scrutiny or reduce the
standard of review.”). This approach reflects the notion that fundamental rights belong to
individuals, not groups, in the United States.
141. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
142. Id. at 261–64. Writing for the majority, Justice Felix Frankfurter explained:
In the face of this history [of racial violence in Illinois] and its frequent obligato
of extreme racial and religious propaganda, we would deny experience to say
that the Illinois legislature was without reason in seeking ways to curb false or
malicious defamation of racial and religious groups, made in public places and
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to Brandenburg v. Ohio,143 however, states and the federal government were free to
create and enforce civil and criminal “group libel” laws. These laws permitted legal
sanctions to be applied to individuals or groups who libeled a particular set of
individuals based on, for example, race, religion, or gender. Brandenburg,
however, in conjunction with New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,144 rejected the legal
underpinnings of the doctrine of group libel. The offensiveness of speech does not,
as a general matter, affect its constitutionally protected status; nor does the
possibility of speech creating general hostility or social unrest within the
community serve as a controlling legal consideration that may overbear a free
speech claim.
Brandenburg holds that only speech that presents an immediate risk of inciting
disorder or violence may be proscribed consistently with the First Amendment,145
and New York Times Co. v. Sullivan protects true speech virtually absolutely and
affords even false speech significant protection when it relates to a public official, a
public figure, or a matter of public concern.146 In tandem, these two precedents
make it virtually impossible to afford groups protection from targeted insult.
by means calculated to have a powerful emotional impact on those to whom it
was presented.
Id. at 261. He added:
It would, however, be arrant dogmatism, quite outside the scope of our
authority in passing on the powers of a State, for us to deny that the Illinois
legislature may warrantably believe that a man’s job and his educational
opportunities and the dignity accorded him may depend as much on the
reputation of the racial and religious group to which he willy-nilly belongs, as
on his own merits. This being so, we are precluded from saying that speech
concededly punishable when immediately directed at individuals cannot be
outlawed if directed at groups with whose position and esteem in society the
affiliated individual may be inextricably involved.
Id. at 263.
143. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
144. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
145. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447 (holding that “the constitutional guarantees of
free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of
force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action”).
146. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279–80 (“The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a
federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory
falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with
‘actual malice’—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not.”). This approach has the effect of affording significant
constitutional protection to objectively false statements of fact. The rationale for this result is
the need for adequate breathing space for a free press: “that debate on public issues should
be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.” Id. at 270.
Subsequent cases have broadly construed the Sullivan principle to apply also to public
figures and to coverage of matters of public concern that do not involve either a public
official or a public figure. See Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 771–77
(1986) (surveying the relevant precedents in the Sullivan line and discussing the application
of the Sullivan rule in various contexts including cases involving public officials, public
figures, and private figures involved in a matter of public concern).
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Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell147 removes any residual doubts about this
question (particularly when read in conjunction with Snyder v. Phelps). In Hustler,
the Supreme Court held protected a fake Campari ad in Hustler magazine that
suggested the Reverend Jerry Falwell’s first sexual encounter involved a drunken
rendezvous in an outhouse with his mother—thus demonstrating with convincing
clarity that we have no conception of personal dignity or honor in our legal
system.148 Chief Justice Rehnquist explained:
“Outrageousness” in the area of political and social discourse has an
inherent subjectiveness about it which would allow a jury to impose
liability on the basis of the jurors’ tastes or views, or perhaps on the
basis of their dislike of a particular expression. An “outrageousness”
standard thus runs afoul of our longstanding refusal to allow damages
to be awarded because the speech in question may have an adverse
emotional impact on the audience.149
This notion that intentionally outrageous speech enjoys protection, even when
specifically calculated to inflict maximum emotional harm,150 privileges the
individual bomb-thrower over his victims. It represents a radical break from the
current constitutional practice of most other industrial democracies, including
Canada, France, Germany, and South Africa—all nations where the government
may create and enforce group-based rights that help to advance a project of
pluralism and multiculturalism.
Once again, the distrust thesis appears to offer a plausible explanation for this
disjunction in both the theory and the operationalization of fundamental human
rights. If one believes government to be at best inept and at worst corrupt, vesting it
with the power to create and enforce group-based rights could be seen a very bad
idea. Some groups, inevitably, will enjoy more robust protection than others (i.e.,
groups with political clout). Instead of redressing political, economic, and social
inequality, the regime of group-protection will simply exacerbate the preexisting
inequalities; it will magnify and amplify rather than eradicate them. Thus, from a

147. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
148. See id. at 47–48, 54–57.
149. Id. at 55.
150. See Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270, 1273 (4th Cir. 1986) (noting that, when asked
by plaintiff’s counsel, during a sworn deposition, if he was trying to harm Reverend
Falwell’s reputation for integrity, Larry Flynt responded that his intention was not to merely
“harm” Falwell’s reputation, but rather was “to assassinate it”), rev’d sub nom. Hustler
Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988); see also RODNEY A. SMOLLA, JERRY FALWELL
V. LARRY FLYNT: THE FIRST AMENDMENT ON TRIAL 59–60 (1988); Boyd C. Farnum, Note,
Free Speech and Freedom from Speech: Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, the New York Times
Actual Malice Standard, and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 63 IND. L.J. 877,
877 (1988) (reporting that Flynt’s motive in publishing the parody Campari ad was “to
assassinate” Falwell’s reputation); Post, supra note 100, at 605, 609–10 (same). Larry
Flynt’s lawyers prevailed on him to offer a better defense while testifying during the trial
itself; at the trial, Flynt declined to repeat his earlier deposition testimony and instead said
that he did not intend the parody to have “any effect” on Falwell’s reputation. See SMOLLA,
supra, at 138–39.
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U.S. perspective, a government empowered to declare political truths is too
dangerous to be tolerated.151
The U.S. approach to free speech theory plainly reflects a prophylactic rule
aimed at preventing government from using its authority to perpetuate itself.
Professor Marty Redish and his coauthor, Elizabeth Cisar, have aptly noted that
“[a]lthough one may of course debate the scope or meaning of particular
constitutional provisions, it would be difficult to deny that in establishing their
complex structure, the Framers were virtually obsessed with a fear—bordering on
what some might uncharitably describe as paranoia—of the concentration of
political power.”152 Professor Michael Asimow concurs, noting that “[a]
generalized distrust of government officials and government power is a recurrent
strain in American history.”153 In an earlier writing, I have observed that “[t]o a
remarkable degree, Americans tend to be hostile toward government and its
motives.”154
The root causes of this skepticism toward government and its agents is difficult
to diagnose, but my own view is that it relates to the remarkable pluralism of the
United States: “the United States was, in large measure, a nation built not on ties of
religion, ethnic kinship, or even geography, but rather on immigration.”155 Given
that we cannot know, in general, whether our group (however defined) will
command the levers of government power at any given place or time, it is entirely
rational to respond by seeking to limit the power of government to impact our daily
lives. By way of contrast, “[i]n a nation sharing a common ethnic, religious, and
cultural heritage, trust in government might well come more naturally, and be held
more readily, than in a nation built of immigrants that still features significant
divisions based on race, ethnicity, religion, region, urbanization, and culture.”156
In such a place, permitting government to establish civility rules, including rules
designed to protect privacy or personal honor, will raise the specter of these rules
being used strategically to benefit some groups at the expense of others.157

151. See Lidsky, supra note 126, at 1096–97 (arguing that protection of false speech
relates to the dangers inherent in a government empowered to censor speech and declare
historical truth, rather than in the objective value of false statements of fact).
152. Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth J. Cisar, “If Angels Were to Govern”: The Need for
Pragmatic Formalism in Separation of Powers Theory, 41 DUKE L.J. 449, 451 (1991).
153. Michael Asimow, Popular Culture and the Adversary System, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
653, 662 (2007). He adds that “[a] substantial number of Americans suspect government
officials and agencies of meddlesomeness, incompetence, or corruption.” Id. at 663; see also
GARY WILLS, A NECESSARY EVIL: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN DISTRUST OF GOVERNMENT 319
(1999) (suggesting that we foolishly believe that “[i]nefficiency is to be our safeguard
against despotism” because we mistakenly believe “that a government unable to do much of
anything will be unable to oppress us”).
154. Krotoszynski, The Shot (Not) Heard ’Round the World, supra note 56, at 28.
155. Id. at 31.
156. Id. at 33.
157. See Post, supra note 100, at 624–32 (arguing that permitting the imposition of tort
liability based on a standard of “outrageousness” would permit empowered groups within the
community to silence less empowered groups within the community through a de facto
heckler’s veto and therefore should be rejected in order to ensure that all communities enjoy
equal dignity under the law). I think that Professor Post has this right: if a choice must be
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Moreover, the whole purpose of the First Amendment subtly shifts: rather than
serving as a means of protecting speech because of its social value or worth, it
serves instead as another structural bulwark against the perceived risk of tyranny.
Speech does not merit protection because it always and invariably produces social
benefits that offset its social costs, but rather because a government broadly
empowered to regulate speech is also a government empowered to perpetuate itself
at the expense of the citizenry.
Thus, as Professor Lyrissa Lidsky observes, “even if First Amendment theory’s
faith in the fundamental rationality of public discourse is misplaced, distrust of
government still may be a strong enough basis, standing alone, to warrant declaring
any attempt to punish Holocaust denial unconstitutional.”158 A prophylactic
concern with the dangers of government censorship, rather than a belief that racist,
sexist, or homophobic speech has value, arguably undergirds the U.S. approach.
Moreover, as Lidsky correctly notes, “[p]ast governmental attempts to ‘prescribe
what shall be orthodox’ have resulted in suppression of truth and enshrinement of
error.”159
Even though no reasonable person disbelieves known historical facts, we
nevertheless deny government the power to declare “truth” out of a fear that such a
power would inevitably be used for crass partisan reasons; better to protect obvious
falsehoods than to risk the suppression of inconvenient truths. Mandatory civility
norms, designed to protect personal privacy or honor, using standards such as the
offensiveness, outrageousness, or intrusiveness of speech, would create a powerful
means of censoring, via the civil law, unpopular speakers and groups.160 Thus, the
U.S. approach reflects a profound skepticism about the ability of government to use
its power to censor wisely, even if the outcome of adopting this approach permits
gross intrusions on undoubtedly legitimate dignity interests.
To be clear, having Nazis march in Skokie, Illinois, to terrorize and demean
Holocaust survivors is undeniably a bad thing;161 the pain and mental anguish
associated with such targeted and intentionally offensive speech is clearly beyond
peradventure.162 But the question of how speech affects group-based dignity
interests is simply not relevant to contemporary First Amendment analysis.
made between protecting only some groups within our polity (namely, those already
enjoying social and political privilege) or protecting no groups, surely it is more logical to
level down than to attempt to level up.
158. Lidsky, supra note 126, at 1097.
159. Id. (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)).
160. See Post, supra note 100, at 624–25.
161. See Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied sub nom. Smith v.
Collin, 439 U.S. 916 (1978); cf. RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, MUST WE DEFEND
NAZIS?: HATE SPEECH, PORNOGRAPHY, AND THE NEW FIRST AMENDMENT (1997) (arguing that
protection of group-based dignitarian interests should be deemed fully consistent with a
robust protection of the freedom of speech).
162. See Richard Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets,
and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 134–35, 179–81 (1982) (arguing that
“an independent tort action for racial insults is both permissible and necessary” and setting
forth the proposed elements of such a cause of action); Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to
Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2332 (1989) (arguing
that a formalized “legal response to racist speech is required” because of “the structural
reality of racism in America”); see also MARI J. MATSUDA, CHARLES R. LAWRENCE III,
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Viewed from a global perspective, these concerns seem strikingly misplaced, if
not entirely paranoid. Germany, for example, reasonably believes that a
government empowered to punish those who vilify Jews and deny the Holocaust
simply does not present a risk of totalitarian oppression; rather, under the German
risk calculus, would-be fascists constitute the greater and more pressing risk to the
existing free and democratic social order (a risk that must be checked through the
use of government power). Objective facts exist, and there is little value in
permitting misguided individuals to pollute the marketplace of ideas by
disseminating objectively false speech, particularly when the speech at issue
degrades and demeans various segments of German society.
Moreover, given the importance of making a pluralistic society function
effectively, certain kinds of untruths impose significantly higher social costs than
others. From this vantage point, government has an entirely legitimate, if not
compelling, interest in enacting and strictly enforcing speech regulations that help
to secure and maintain a well-functioning multicultural polity. To permit an
individual to exercise fundamental rights in ways that impose tremendous social
costs simply cannot be justified, and a democratically elected government may
legitimately exercise the coercive power of the state to suppress the dissemination
of such ideas.
In sum, a polity makes a critical choice when it decides whether to frame the
vesting and exercise of human rights only in the individual, rather than in the
individual and also the collective. A communitarian approach to the creation and
enforcement of human rights will lead to very different outcomes in an important
range of cases than will framing and enforcing human rights solely from the
perspective of an autonomous individual. “Privacy” is a concept that reflects an
individual-centric conception of rights, whereas “dignity” implicates the broader
community, both with respect to the vesting of rights and also with respect to the
balancing of conflicting human rights.
CONCLUSION
Privacy is a concept that can and does bear multiple meanings. In the United
States, privacy is primarily a set of important autonomy interests that run against
the state, rather than a right to proprietary control over important personal
information. In thinking about the legal importance of privacy in a transatlantic
context, privacy’s status as a polysemous legal construct must be taken into
consideration. In a very real sense, privacy in the EU and privacy in the United
States have very little to do with each other. Teasing out why this is so, and why
Americans are so indifferent to the commodification of their personal data, is a
question worthy and deserving of sustained consideration by legal academics on
both sides of the Atlantic.

RICHARD DELGADO & KIMBERLÈ WILLIAMS CRENSHAW, WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL
RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1993) (offering a variety
of theoretical, philosophical, and practical arguments in favor of stronger government
restrictions against hate speech). For a recent treatment of the issues and arguments favoring
regulation of so-called “hate speech,” see JEREMY WALDRON, THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH
(2012).
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At the same time, in some specific contexts, such as tort law, where a shared
commitment to protecting privacy as an important social and cultural value exists,
significant cultural and legal differences between the United States and Europe
make creating and implementing a shared human rights vision difficult, if not
impossible. In particular, the U.S. commitment to elevating expressive freedom
over other important social values, such as privacy, dignity, and personal honor,
renders a common approach to safeguarding privacy in the tort context a practical
impossibility. The U.S. approach is not unconsidered, however; a pervasive distrust
of government leads courts to disallow efforts to control speech—both through
direct regulations that incorporate content or viewpoint limitations (e.g., a ban on
hate speech, restrictions on minors’ access to violent video games, or depictions of
animal cruelty)163 and also through more indirect means, such as use of the
common law of tort as applied by civil juries.164
If the current trend in the United States continues, there may in fact be precious
little legal space for the use of tort law to safeguard privacy or reputational interests
more generally if the offending speech relates, in any conceivable way, to a matter
of public concern.165 It seems equally clear, however, that in Europe the freedom of
expression often loses out when the state seeks to safeguard privacy, including
dignity, reputation, and personal honor. The definitional problems present a serious
impediment to a transnational dialogue about privacy rights. The operational
problems, on the other hand, seem to present an insurmountable obstacle to a
common understanding of the right of privacy (and particularly in the tort context),
unless the right is defined so abstractly as to be virtually meaningless—a mere
platitude.

163. The U.S. Supreme Court has consistently and reliably rejected government
programs that rely on content- or viewpoint-based regulations of speech. See Brown v.
Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011) (rejecting a California law restricting
childrens’ access to violent video games as an impermissible form of content
discrimination); Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011) (invalidating limits on
access to physicans’ prescription data, adopted to curb aggressive marketing techniques by
pharmaceutical representatives, because the regulations constituted content and viewpoint
discrimination); United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010) (invalidating a federal law
that banned depictions of animal cruelty because the law discriminated against particular
content); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (plurality opinion) (invalidating a
municipal ordinance against hate speech because it constituted a form of content and
viewpoint discrimination). But cf. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705
(2010) (rejecting a First Amendment challenge brought against a content-based federal law
that prohibited providing “material support or resources” to a terrorist organization and
holding that the statute passed strict scrutiny by advancing a compelling government interest
in a narrowly tailored way). The Humanitarian Law Project decision constitutes the
exception that proves the general rule (i.e., that content-based restrictions on speech
presumptively violate the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment).
164. See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 U.S. 1207, 1218–19 (2011) (disallowing the imposition of
civil liability under state tort law where such liability would burden constitutionally
protected speech); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50–51 (1988) (same).
165. See Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2668, 2672 (rejecting privacy-based justifications offered
by Vermont in defense of a state law banning the sale of physician prescription data to
pharmaceutical companies for marketing purposes).
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Moreover, this conflict in fundamental values will prove to be of more than
merely academic interest.166 Anyone publishing books, magazines, or newspapers,
or making content available in Europe via the Internet, has cause to be concerned
over the radically different accommodations of privacy, on the one hand, and
expressive freedoms, on the other. Given that important cultural traits help to
ground and explain these differences, coming to a common understanding will be,
at best, quite difficult. If we were to abjure “privacy” and even “dignity” in favor of
more discrete characterizations of the particular liberty interests at stake, we could
at least begin a meaningful dialogue about our precise differences in both theory
and law and why they exist.
To the extent that the use of high-sounding, but vague, human rights
nomenclature permits judges, lawyers, and even ordinary citizens to talk past each
other, finding common ground will be the harder for it. Polysemy is not an evil in
and of itself, but when polysemy impedes the attainment of a workable system of
global human rights, it becomes essential to find more definite and concrete ways
of articulating the fundamental interests that we seek to protect from unreasonable
or unjust government abridgment.

166. See Timothy Zick, Falsely Shouting Fire in a Global Theater: Emerging
Complexities of Transborder Expression, 65 VAND. L. REV. 125, 131 (2012) (observing that
“[g]lobal channels of speech, press, and association have become tightly interconnected” and
suggesting that “[g]lobalization, digitization, and the proliferation of media outlets blur the
lines between domestic- and foreign-speech marketplaces”). Zick argues that “[p]otentially
harmful domestic, expressive activities increasingly have transborder effects” and posits that
“[i]n the global theater, increased interconnectivity and the compression of space and time
will enhance speakers’ ability to communicate offensive and incendiary messages and to
enter associations with disfavored and potentially dangerous foreign organizations.” Id. at
186. Obviously, the transborder effects that Zick describes will create a real and pressing
need for greater efforts to reach a common understanding of how to define and enforce
expressive freedoms—including speech, press, and assembly—especially in circumstances
where the exercise of these expressive freedoms conflicts with other constitutional values,
such as privacy and human dignity. See id. at 131 (“At home, abroad, and in cyberspace,
citizens increasingly participate in global debates and enter relationships with aliens who are
located abroad.”).

